I did not, for example, choose to be sexually and emotionally attracted to the female gender. Yet I am. Thus, as a result, my choice is to seek out a woman in a way that fulfills this innate preference.
Looking at this statement again, it strikes me as being incorrect.
Your attraction to females is not a choice; therefore, your "seeking out" of females is not a choice comparable to the choice, for example, of deciding what to eat when you're hungry. Your 'seeking out' of females is more akin to the basic need to find something to eat, than to the choice of what to eat. The choice of what to eat would be comparable to the choice of what woman to pursue, not to the artificial 'choice' you've posited, of deciding to pursue a man rather than a woman.
If your choice in the matter is deciding which woman to pursue (or put off pursuing), then that is where you will exercise your preference. To call your sexual orientation a preference is misleading. It is not just that you prefer women over men, it is that you do not have a natural sexual attraction to men at all.
In other words, you would not suggest that if you were hungry, seeking out a sandwich over a hunk of scrap metal was a choice that fulfilled an innate preference. It is much more fundamental than that. The scrap metal is not really a choice for you to satisfy your hunger, any more than a man is really a choice for you to satisfy your romantic longings. So the idea of 'choice' here is false.
No, you do not have the free will to pursue a romantic relationship with someone for whom you feel no romantic attraction. If you feel no romantic attraction, you aren't pursuing romance, you're mimicking the pursuit of romance. So, yes, you do have free will to pursue a relationship with a male, in imitation of a romantic relationship.
Exactly. I can try. I won't succeed. But I can try.
No, you cannot try to feel something. That is not the way human beings work. You cannot try to feel fear you don't feel. You cannot try to feel love you don't feel. You cannot try to feel attraction you don't feel. This fundamental example you've posited is false.
I am not forced by my nature to act in a particular fashion. I can act in a way that ignores my natural predisposition.
You are forced by your nature to have certain impulses and feelings. You can choose how you will deal with those natural impulses and feelings. You can pursue a woman, or you can squelch your sexual desire. Pursuing a man in order to satisfy your desire for a woman is not a natural choice. It would only be brought about by extraordinary circumstances of some kind. It is therefore not an exercise of free will in the same way that exercising a choice within the parameters of your natural inclinations is an exercise of free will.
You've been equating the process of taking action according to your natural impulses and feelings, with the process of taking action in opposition to your natural impulses and feelings. In the first case, action would flow without effort as a natural part of your disposition; in the second case, action would require extaordinary purpose and effort in a thwarting of that natural disposition. So in your Adam and Eve scenario, obeying God would have been the effortless and natural outcome, whereas disobeying God would have required extraordinary purpose and effort. Yet you seem to want to say that in a scenario positing these two choices, either choice would represent the same exercise of free will.
Suppose you and a friend are enjoying an evening together in front of a fire; your friend is about to offer you a choice of two apples for your eating pleasure. You would very much like to have one of the apples. He puts one of the apples on the coffee table next to you, and tosses the other into the flames. Which apple do you exercise your free will in choosing? Are the choices equal? Are they equal examples of the exercise of free will? Are you not 'free-er' to take the apple from the table than to take the apple from the flames, because there are no constraints on that choice? What circumstance would have to exist, to cause you to choose to take the apple from the fire?
Your argument seems to be that God could have made it as difficult for Adam and Eve to choose disobedience over obedience, as it is for you to choose the apple in the fire over the apple on the table, without violating their free will. I think there's something fishy about your argument.
Not influence the outcome? I'm suddenly reminded of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle.
I'm not familiar with that principle.
But really, this seems to be the whole point of your argument. You seem to be saying that God could have influenced the outcome of the apple test by pre-disposing us to obey, thus preempting the bothersome problem of eternal damnation.
Being capable of going against one's predispositions, one's programming if you will, is the essence of free will to my mind.
Well, it is not to mine. I think it is a rather strange notion.
My concept of free will is a heterosexual male deciding to wait until marriage to satisfy his urges, or deciding to take some condoms with him on his date, or deciding to go to the red light district and satisfy his appetites.
Your concept of free will is a heterosexual male deciding to have sex with a man. Would he do this absent some extraordinary circumstance? If not, then is it really a matter of 'free' will?
Pardon? We couldn't make choices without predispositions. Predispositions imply preferences.
We've not been talking about mere preferences. We've not been talking about the mechanism for choosing Lindt chocolate over Hershey's. You put the question in terms of practical absolutes:
But my innate preference makes this choice seem so terribly unpleasant as to make the chances of my taking this option effectively nil.
We all act as our natures dictate.
We've been talking about absolute predispositions; we've been talking about our natures, not our preferences.
Having those predispositions wouldn't have forced them to obey God.
It would have forced them to go against their nature in order to disobey God.
Yes, and as long as they could go against that nature, then they still had as much free will as you or I have.
I think this idea of "as much free will as you or I have" is the point at which we're not connecting. The comparison isn't between an amount of free will a pre-disposed Adam and Eve would have had, and the amount of free will we have, to make decisions within the parameters of our natural inclinations.
The comparison concerns the concept of 'free', within the context of making a choice. The choice is between doing something one is naturally inclined to do, and doing something one is naturally disinclined to do, and which action would therefore require the exercise of extraordinary purpose and will in order to accomplish. That scenario does not represent the concept of 'free,' as it relates to the idea of being equally 'free' to make one choice, as to make the other.
As long as they could go against the preferences God gave them, then they could not be called slaves to His will.
Neither could it be said that they were free; they are not free to disobey, anymore than you are free to feel romantically attracted to a man. We're not talking about either absolute slavery or absolute freedom. We're talking about the freedom to make choices within certain parameters.
I suppose it all comes down to definitions in the end.
free will - 1 : the power of willing or choosing within certain limitations or with respect to certain matters without the restraints of physical or divinely imposed necessity or outside causal law : spontaneous will or partially causeless volition.
To me this perfectly describes the case of a heterosexual male making choices about how to exercise his sexuality within the parameters of his pre-disposed sexual orientation. He is not a slave to God's will.
I'm not sure it describes as well, a heterosexual male choosing for some reason to engage in sexual activity with another man. It seems to me that that scenario implies some kind of imposed necessity; that is, this man really is a slave to some kind of circumstance or situation, because otherwise he would not be acting as he is acting. His action would certainly not be spontaneous, and it seems to me that it would not be even partially causeless. So not free.
:):)